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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS PRESENT
STATUS IN LOUISIANA
John W. Wade*
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES

The common law doctrine of contributory negligence-that
plaintiff's negligence bars his recovery completely-is of fairly recent origin. By consensus, its origin has been traced to Butterfield v.
1
Forrester,
an 1809 King's Bench decision, in which a plaintiff, who
was riding rapidly at dusk down a road in the town of Derby, fell
and was hurt when his horse tripped over an obstruction that the
defendant left protruding into the road. "Two things," said Lord
Ellenborough, "must concur to support this action, an obstruction in
the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want or care to avoid
it on the part of the plaintiff."2
The explanation for the matter-of-fact adoption of the doctrine
lies, I believe, in two pervasive policies of the common law that
were usually not spelled out but still regarded as fundamental at the
time. The first was the puritanical view that the courts should give
no assistance to a wrongdoer who suffered an injury or a loss as the
result of his wrongdoing. The courts let the loss lie where it fell.
Aside from contributory negligence there are numerous examples of
this attitude: no contribution between joint tortfeasors, no restitution to a party to an illegal contract, no relief to a "volunteer" who
conferred a benefit on the defendant.
The second policy was a passion for a simple issue that could be
answered categorically yes or no. The whole purpose of common law
pleading was to reduce a legal dispute to issues of this nature.
There are numerous other illustrations of this common law policy of
shunning the compromise of an issue and limiting the possible responses to yes or no, all or nothing. Take, for example, contribution
and indemnity between joint tortfeasors. If one of two joint tortfeasors had paid the whole of the claim and sought contribution, the
answer was no (nothing), because he was seeking partial relief.
*Distinguished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Reporter, Restatement
(Second) of Torts; Chairman, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws Drafting Committee on Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
1. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
2. I& at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
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There were situations, however, in which he might successfully seek
indemnity and thus obtain an answer of yes (all).'
A remarkably similar result soon developed with the doctrine of
contributory negligence. It was a harsh, arbitrary rule. And, as
always happens with rules of this nature, exceptions developed, to
be used in especially appealing cases. The two principal exceptions
were last clear chance and defendant's misconduct of a different
nature than plaintiff's contributory negligence (intentional tort, willful and wanton misconduct, strict liability). Under these exceptions
the plaintiff received all, rather than nothing.4 The common law
simply did not consider the possibility of granting the plaintiff
damages reduced in proportion to the measure of his negligence.
That would be entirely beneath the dignity of the court.'
These two English common law policies were imported into this
country. Thus, the contributory negligence doctrine promptly crossed
the Atlantic and was adopted without question or dissent. Solidly
established, it was nourished and strengthened by the coming of the
Industrial Revolution and a recognized need to protect the growth
of the nascent railroads as a means of binding the country together!
The doctrine held almost undisputed sway in the United States
and in the other common law countries during the nineteenth century. During the early part of the second half of the century, there
were, however, some murmurs of discontent. Two midwestern states
-Illinois and Kansas-did experience what was generally regarded
as an aberration in condemning the fairness of the doctrine and
developing a slight-gross doctrine-that a plaintiff might recover if
his negligence was slight in comparison with that of the defendant.
This was not what is today called comparative negligence; it was
merely another exception to the contributory negligence rule, allowing the plaintiff to recover full damages. This "exception" was very
conducive to appellate litigation and it soon faded away.7
3. See generally Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk- Comparative v. Contributory Negligence, 21 VAND. L. REV. 938, 940-41 (1968).
4. It has sometimes been argued that with these exceptions, the differences
averaged out and thus produced a fair result. But the averages benefited no individual.
In each single case, one party or the other was treated unfairly.
5. Equity would have been ready to reach a compromise, and tort law might
have been quite different if negligence cases had been tried in courts of equity instead
of common law courts.
6. See generally Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL.
L. REV. 151 (1946).
7. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, in SELECTED ToPIcs OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 1, 30-33 (1954); Malone, supra note 6; Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March (pt. 2), 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 304, 305-13, 317-18 (1950).
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Two southern states-Georgia and Tennessee-went much further. They both creatively interpreted a railroad precautions statute
as if it had expressly provided that when the statute was violated a
plaintiff's contributory negligence would not bar his action but
would have the effect of mitigating his damages.8 These seem to be
the first instances in a common law jurisdiction of what we now call
comparative negligence. The Georgia interpretation subsequently
was expressly incorporated into the statute and exists today? The
Tennessee statute was amended to eliminate the interpretation in
1959.'" Both states have had other developments, too. Georgia extended the doctrine of the railroad cases to other cases through
judicially imaginative use of another statute, and the state is generally classified today as a comparative negligence state, following the
modified system. Through a series of cases beginning in 1858, Tennessee developed, independent of statutes, a unique doctrine of
"remote contributory negligence," which does not bar a recovery
but has the effect of mitigating damages. The Tennessee court has
repeatedly denied that this is comparative negligence and has explained that it is based on a causation principle.11 While the doctrine
still exists, the exact meaning and scope of remote contributory
negligence have never been really clarified, and most commentators
have hesitated to classify Tennessee as a comparative negligence
state.12
The next significant event came in the current century. In 1908,
Congress passed the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),13 providing that in actions for injuries to railroad employees engaged in
interstate commerce, the employee's "contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee." 4 This is comparative negligence of the "pure" type. Congress later used the same provision in the Jones Act 15 and in the
Death on the High Seas Act." The- American admiralty rule had
always recognized a form of comparative negligence, dividing the
8. On Georgia, see Hilkey, Comparative Negligence in Georgia, 8 GA. B.J. 51
(1945); Turk, supra note 7, at 326-33. On Tennessee, see Turk, supra note 7, at 313-17;
Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past,Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REv. 423, 430-44 (1974).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1979).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1209 (1976).
11. See Wade, Crawford & Ryder, supra note 8, at 430-44.
12. Id. See also Turk, supra note 7, at 316.
13. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
14. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
16. 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976).
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damages evently, or pro rata.Y In 1975, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 8 judicially changed this rule
to adopt the pure form, diminishing the damages in proportion to
the relative percentages of fault. The federal government is thus fully committed to the pure form of comparative negligence.
In 1910, two years after passage of the FELA, Mississippi passed a
similar statute applying to all types of negligence actions, 9 thus
becoming the first state with a comprehensive statute on the subject. Influenced by the FELA, over a dozen states passed similar
statutes confined to railroad employees engaged in intrastate activities or to some other limited group of plaintiffs.
In 1913, Nebraska adopted a slight-gross system," allowing a
plaintiff to recover diminished damages if his negligence was slight
in comparison with the defendant's. There was a gap until 1931,
when Wisconsin adopted a statute modeled on the FELA, but following a modified system (plaintiff can recover diminished damages if
his negligence was less than the defendant's).2 South Dakota followed with a Nebraska slight-gross type of statute in 1941.22 Arkansas enacted a pure-form statute in 1955, but in 1957 amended it to
adopt the modified form.23 And Maine adopted a modified form in
1965.24
Thus, by the latter 1960's, only seven states (plus the federal
government) had abandoned contributory negligence and substituted
some form of comparative negligence. They offered scattered approaches and there was no reason to anticipate any significant
changes in the future.
In the meantime, England, where contributory negligence originated, had adopted a comparative negligence statute in 1945, 2 and
most of the common law countries had followed the example. 26 It
E.g., The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
421 U.S. 397 (1975).
19. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1978).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975).
21. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1913). The statute has since been amended to provide
that the plaintiff can recover if his negligence was "not greater than" the defendant's.
WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (West 1979).
22. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1978).
23. ARK. STAT. -ANN. § 27-1730.1-2 (1957) (now appearing as ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27-1763 to 1765 (1977)).
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1978).
25. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
26. See J. FLEMING, TORTS 255-60 (5th ed. 1977). See also UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
17.
18.

INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND CONCURRENT

WRONGDOERS (Report No. 31, 1979).
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was said that the United States was "the last stronghold" of contributory negligence.27
Also in the meantime something else, more important in this
connection, was occurring. The idea of no-fault insurance, or motor
vehicle accident reparations, had been conceived on the basis of the
usual medical-payments clause of the automobile liability policies,
had taken concrete form in a model act, and was being vigorously
pushed. Keeton and O'Connell's Basic Protectionfor the Traffic Victim was published in 1965, and other books and articles were stirring up widespread public interest. The principal basis of the
legislative campaign was an attack on the common law tort system
for designated weaknesses. And the foremost target was the contributory negligence rule. There was no way to defend its obvious
unfairness and the legal profession knew it.28 The common law negligence system might be more effectively defended against the
onslaught if this critically weak portion of the system was straightened out. So members of the legal profession-plaintiff's attorneys
and defendant's attorneys alike-began to support statutes adopting
some form of comparative negligence.29
The result was a tidal wave of new statutes. Four states passed
statutes in 1969," ° one in 1970,' and four in 1971.32 1973 was a banner
year: nine statutes were passed 33 and the Florida Supreme Court
judicially adopted the pure form of comparative negligence in the
landmark case of Hoffman v. Jones.4 With these additions, the
number of states totaled twenty-six in 1973; thus, a majority of the
states had now abandoned contributory negligence.
The no-fault drive had begun to bog down by this time, and the
fear of a federal no-fault statute was diminishing. Only Kansas passed a
comparative negligence statute in 1974. By 1975, the movement had
picked up again, but by now it was motivated not so much by fear of
27. Prosser, supra note 7, at 3.
28. The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious
injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on
one of them alone, and that one, the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and
quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot free. No one
has succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will.
I& at 7.
29. See, e.g., Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations, Report, 94
A.B.A. REP. 559, 609-11, 675-79 (1969).
30. Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Hampshire. Citations are given in
note 35, infra.
31. Vermont.
32. Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, and Rhode Island.
33. Connecticut, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
34. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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no-fault as by a desire to produce a better system, one that would
be as fair as possible to all parties. The supreme courts of California
and Alaska judicially adopted comparative negligence, and, following
the lead of Florida, determined that the pure form was the fairest.
New York, which already had a no-fault statute and was not acting
for the purpose of averting one, also opted for the pure form. Montana was the fourth state in 1975. Pennsylvania was the only state
in 1976.
There were no new developments until 1979. In this year the
supreme courts of Michigan and West Virginia judicially adopted
comparative negligence and Louisiana enacted statutory provisions
to this effect. Louisiana and Michigan chose the pure form and West
Virginia a modified form.
There is thus a present total of thirty-five states that are properly classified as comparative negligence states. 5 This is 70% of the
states, well over two-thirds. Also to be mentioned are Puerto Rico 6
and the Canal Zone,37 and several additional states with statutes
covering more limited factual situations.3"
A breakdown of the types of comparative negligence adopted by
the individual states is as follows:
(1) States adopting the pure form of comparative negligence
(nine): Alaska, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
35. See Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to
-1765 (1977); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-57(h)
(West 1979) (general); 1979 Conn. Legis. Serv., Pub. Act No. 79-483, § 4 (West 1979)
(products liability); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 66-402, 94-703, 105-603 (1979); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801
to -806 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b (1976); 1979 La. Acts, No. 431; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch, 231, § 85 (Law. Co-op.
1978); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638,275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.02 (West 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-702 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41-141 (1977);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West 1978);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11-12 (West 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 18-470 (1977); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1978); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1978); Utah
CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (1979); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va.
1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1979); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977). See
also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (admiralty); 45 U.S.C.
§ 53 (1976) (FELA); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (Jones Act); 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976) (Death on
High Seas Act).
36. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1976).
37. C.Z. CODE tit. 4, § 1357 (1963).
38. See notes 47-51, infra.
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New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. In addition, the federal
statutes adopt the pure form, as do Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone.
The North Dakota statute is worded as adopting a modified form
(plaintiff's negligence "not as great as" that of defendant), but the
state supreme court has construed it as having "in effect adopted
the pure comparative negligence concept at least in instances involving more than one tortfeasor."39 In addition to its general statute,
Connecticut has enacted a special statute applying the pure form to
cases involving products liability." There are numerous states with
statutes using the pure form for more limited fact situations, such
as railroad employees in intrastate employment. Finally, it should be
noted that England and all of the other common law countries shifting to comparative negligence have taken the pure form.
(2) States adopting the modified form allowing recovery if the
plaintiff's fault is "not greater than" that of the defendant (thirteen):
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin."
(3) States adopting the modified form and requiring that the
plaintiff's fault be "not as great as" that of the defendant (eleven):
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota,42
Oklahoma, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
(4) States adopting the slight-gross system (two): Nebraska and
South Dakota.
This makes a total of thirty-five states.
(5) States that may be generally classed as continuing to follow
the common law rule of contributory negligence (fifteen): Alabama,
Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. There are questions as to whether some of
these states belong in this list or will remain in it long. For example,
Tennessee has its unique doctrine of remote contributory negligence, which is a sort of comparative negligence based on causation;
and the state supreme court has recently declined to rule on
whether it should judicially equate this with comparative negligence, on the ground that the issue was not properly raised in the
court below. Missouri has its own unique doctrinal approach-the
39. Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D. 1979).
40. 1979 Conn. Legis. Serv., Pub. Act No. 79-483, § 4 (West 1979).
41. Several states in this group had previously been in group three, but recently
amended their statutes.
42. See text at note 39, supra.
43. Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1976). See notes 8-12, supra, and
accompanying text.
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"humanitarian doctrine" -and. its supreme court has recently declined to pass on the judicial adoption of comparative negligence
"for the present" and in a case in which the issue was not properly
raised below." The Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that
contribution will be enforced between joint tortfeasors in proportion
to the relative fault of the parties; 5 and members of the court and
subsequent commentators have openly speculated that this is a
prelude to judicial adoption of comparative negligence.46
In addition, seven of these contributory negligence states have
statutes applying comparative negligence in a limited area. Thus,
the states of Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Ohio have "state
FELA acts," applying to intrastate railroad employees.47 Arizona has
a similar employment statute covering certain hazardous occupations.48 Virginia has a statute applying to railroad-crossing
accidents. 9 And South Carolina had a statute covering automobile
accidents,"0 but it has just been delcared in violation of the equal
protection clause because of its limited coverage."1
This leaves only five states-Alabama, Delaware, Indiana,
Maryland, and New Mexico-untouched by some aspect of comparative negligence. This contrasts ironically with the situation only
twenty-five years ago, when there were only five states that recognized comparative negligence.
A further comment on the national situation is warranted. The
contemporary trend is an accelerating one toward the pure form. Of
the last eight states to turn to comparative negligence, five have
selected the pure form. To these should be added the 1979 statute in
Connecticut applying the pure form to products liability cases and
the 1979 North Dakota decision construing its statute to apply the
5 12
pure form "at least in instances involving more than one tortfeasor.
Another development should be mentioned here. This is the
drafting and promulgation of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. In
44. Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535, on re-argument, 557
S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1977).
45. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437,
(1978).
46. See Zaremski & Berns, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: Genesis of Comparative
Fault in Illinois?, 67 ILL. B.J. 334 (1979).
47. IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.124 (West 1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.320
(Baldwin 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62.242 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.09 (Page
1973).
48. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-806 (1971).
49. VA. CODE § 56-416 (1978).
50. S.C. CODE § 15-1-300 (1976).
51. Markey v. Kirby, 245 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1978).
52. See notes 39-40, supra, and accompanying text.
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1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States
Laws (NCCUSL) decided that the time was ripe and the circumstances appropriate for the Conference to undertake to draft a
uniform act in the field. The states were adopting statutes hastily,
without due consideration of many problems involved and, therefore,
without adequate treatment of them. Legislative decisions were
often affected by political considerations rather than by a fair and
objective evaluation of the competing interests. The hodge-podge of
provisions and basic approaches and the inevitable need for a continuous stream of decisions filling in gaps and details by statutory
construction or judicial improvisation all pointed to the need for a
careful and complete study of the problem. The NCCUSL Committee
worked on the task for five years. It received suggestions and criticisms on interim drafts of the Act from many persons and groups.
Following its adoption by the Conference in 1979, the Act was not
presented to the American Bar Association for approval because of
some objections raised to some of its provisions by the Section on
Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law. Negotiation has
worked out the major conflicts, and section 3 of the Act was amended
by the NCCUSL in 1979. It is now expected that the Act will be submitted to the House of Delegates of the ABA for approval, and it is
hoped that, following, that the Act will be pressed before the state
legislatures for widespread adoption.
The Act, in its revised form, is reproduced in an appendix at the
end of this symposium." In discussing the new Louisiana statutory
provisions in the latter half of this article, I have occasion to compare them with the provisions of the Uniform Act.
EVALUATION OF THE NEW LOUISIANA PROVISIONSSOME PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTIONS

The new Louisiana provisions on comparative negligence and
contribution between joint tortfeasors have recently been passed, to
take effect in August of 1980."4
As one who has for many years been a diligent student of the
proper legal effect of plaintiff's fault in tort and restitution actions
and who has tried to maintain a balanced and objective viewpoint on
53. In a breakfast talk at the 1978 ABA Convention, I described the Act and discussed the basis of some of the decisions made in drafting it. See Wade, The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379 (1979). For a concise summary of what the Act
does, see id. at 381-83. See also Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Products Liability].
54. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, §§ 1 & 2. For the text of this Act, see pages
289-92, supra.
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the matter, I have undertaken to study these provisions with a view
toward evaluating their soundness and efficacy and perhaps offering
a few constructive suggestions.
Interpretation of the Louisiana Provisions
As I read the Louisiana statute, it seeks to allocate to each party
to an action his proportionate responsibility for the injury depending upon his percentage of the total fault as determined by the trier
of fact.
This goal is praiseworthy from a theoretical standpoint and is
highly desirable if it can be attained from a practical standpoint, and
especially if it has indeed been actually attained by the provisions of
the statute.
To accomplish this the statute provides for:
(1) contribution between joint tortfeasors on the basis of proportionate fault of the parties;
(2) reduction of a negligent plaintiff's recovery in proportion to
his percentage of fault;
(3)

bringing in of third-party defendants; and

(4) submission, to the jury of appropriate questions to determine the amount of a claimant's damages and the percentages of
fault of the relevant parties, so that the judge can allocate the ultimate responsibility of each person.5
A few simple fact situations will serve to illustrate the operation
of the statute.
Case One. A sues B. B joins C as a third-party defendant. The
jury finds A's damages at $10,000,, A not negligent, B 60% negligent, and C 40% negligent. Outcome: A collects $6,000 from B and
$4,000 from C.
Case Two. A sues B and C. The jury finds $10,000 damages, A
20% negligent, B and C each 40% negligent. Outcome: A collects
$4,000 from both B and C and suffers $2,000 loss himself.
This is fine! It produces a result that is entirely reasonable and
perfectly fair to each party concerned. It is much better than most
of the statutory provisions. Thus, it avoids the mix-up of joining
together a reduction of the claimant's recovery by a percentage based
on his fault with an apportionment among the defendants on a basis
of pro rata (virile) portions. It rejects the crude and arbitrary rule of
both of the modified systems of comparative negligence and thus
This is called the "equitable share of the obligation" in the Uniform Act.
§ 2(c). For the text of the Uniform Act, see the appendix to this symposium, infra p. 419.
55.

UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
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avoids all of their serious drawbacks."6 Its use of special interrogatories eliminates the uncertainties involved in the general verdicts
under the FELA and the Mississippi statute and affords the trial
judge a reasonable basis for proper control of the jury.
All of this is entirely to the good. The vital part of the new
Louisiana statutory provisions is quite satisfactory and applies without trouble in the basic situations. But as the situations become complicated, solutions become oblique or uncertain because of some of
the new language or because of the absence of any clear provision
on point.
Method of Allocation of Ultimate Responsibilities
Consider the problem of liability in solido and the dividing of the
obligation between the obligors as set forth in Civil Code article
2103. As I read this it means that each tortfeasor liable in solido
with others is liable to the claimant for the full amount but that the
right of contribution (together with third-party practice) permits a
determination of what the ultimate responsibility of each tortfeasor
will be. This seems quite workable and is similar to the arrangement
in the Uniform Act, which speaks of joint and several liability and
the "equitable share of the obligation.""7
The whole matter is thrown into some doubt, however, by the
amendment added as a second paragraph to article 2324. It provides:
Persons whose concurring fault has caused injury, death or loss
to another are also answerable, in solido, provided, however,
when the amount of recovery has been reduced in accordance
with the preceding article, a judgment debtor shall not be liable
for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to
whom a greater degree of negligence has been attributed, reserving to all parties their respective rights of indemnity and
contribution. 8
56. For an exposition of the disadvantages of the modified systems, see Wade,
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379, 384-86 (1979). For elaboration of
the Uniform Act, see Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act- What Should it Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 223-26 (1972); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
Prefatory Note. See also Sowle & Conkle, Comparative Negligence vs. The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection"A Hypothetical Judicial Decision, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 1083. The Uniform Act adopts the pure system.
57. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(c).
58. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324. The clause imposing in solido liability may present a problem in that the language may be a little
too broad. If the injury is divisible or there are separate losses so that there are
separate harms, then each tortfeasor is liable only for the harm that he caused. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) (apportionment of harm to causes). To
prevent an impairment of this recognized rule, it may be desirable to insert a word
like "single" or "indivisible" before the word "injury" in the clause.
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What does this mean? The following example may be helpful:
Case Three. A sues B, C, D, and E. The jury finds $10,000
damages, A 2 0 % negligent, B 40% negligent, C 20% negligent, D
and E each 10% negligent. A's damages are reduced 20% (or to
$8,000) because of his contributory negligence. B is liable in solido
for the full $8,000 but can obtain contribution from the others to
reduce his ultimate responsibility to $4,000. A does not have attributed to him a "greater degree of negligence" than C, who is therefore also liable in solido for the full amount but can obtain contribution from the others to reduce his ultimate responsibility to $2,000.
Since A does have a greater degree of negligence attributed to him
than do D and E, he cannot recover from them in solido and their
liability to him is only $1,000 each. Why the distinction is drawn is
not clear, assuming they would have been entitled to contribution
too, if held liable for more than their share.
As I analyze it, the complicating feature is a hidden factor not
mentioned in the statutory provisions and therefore left entirely
unsettled. That is the question of who bears the loss when one of
the tortfeasors is insolvent and thus not able to pay his share of the
obligation.
There are several possible solutions: (1) Let the claimant bear
the loss if he is contributorily negligent. Some of the state statutes
reach this result by construing their statutes to abolish joint and
several liability and imposing liability on each joint tortfeasor for
his share alone. This is unfair to the injured party. (2) Let the tortfeasors bear the loss by either, (a) leaving it on the tortfeasor required to pay the full amount of the obligation or (b) spreading it
among the solvent tortfeasors. This is unfair to one or more of the
tortfeasors. (3) Spread the loss among all the parties at fault, including a negligent claimant. The last is the fair solution and the one
adopted in section 2(d) of the Uniform Act. In the case above, for example, assume that C is unable to pay. His $2,000 is spread among
the other parties thus, 2/8 to A, 4/8 to B, 1/8 to D and E each; these
obligations would then be the same as if C had never been joined as
a party.
Take another illustration:
Case Four. A sues B and C. The jury finds $10,000 damages, A
40% negligent, B 30% negligent, and C 30% negligent. B's obligation ($3,000) is uncollectible.
Under the new article 2323, A can collect only $3,000 from C and
he must bear alone the loss of the $3,000 that was to be paid by B.
The Uniform Act, on the other hand, would divide that $3,000 so
that A would bear 4/7 of it and C would bear 3/7 of it. As between A
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and C, the proportion of the loss remains exactly the same as the
jury had originally set it.
I submit that this is the fairest solution and therefore suggest
that it replace the provision found in the second paragraph of the
new article 2323.
Proportion of fault for parties and non-parties
New articles 2323 and 1811 speak of the fault of "another person
or persons" and indicate that their proportion of fault is to be determined. It is not clear whether the "person" must be a party to the
action or may be any person whose fault contributed to the harm.
The decision should be that the determination of fault proportions is
confined to persons who have been made parties to the action. If it
extends to others, the court's ruling on their proportions is not binding upon them and cannot be collected from them, and the whole
question of what is to be done about their shares of the responsibility is left unresolved. Both plaintiffs and defendants have sufficient incentives to join other negligent persons, since this will have
the effect of reducing their percentages of responsibility.
Matters Not Treated by the Louisiana Provisions
There are a number of important matters that are not treated in
the new Louisiana provisions. While some of them may possibly be
worked out by the courts, others are better treated by legislation;
and it seems best to handle them in one comprehensive act. The
Uniform Act attempts to do this. I list some of these matters.
Set-off. Suppose that both parties to an accident were negligent
and both were injured. This is more complicated than it appears at
first sight. There are several types of situations calling for different
results. For example: If both parties are able to pay from their own
assets, set-off is appropriate. If both parties have full insurance
coverage, set-off would confer its benefit on the insurance carriers
rather than the parties and this seems inappropriate. If one party
can pay and the other cannot, set-off protects the first party. If one
party has insurance and the other has not and cannot pay, neither
set-off nor the lack of set-off fully takes care of the problem. The
current set-off provision in the Uniform Act is an amendment
adopted in 1979 and has the approval of plhintiff's attorneys and
defendant's attorneys alike. It seeks to cover all of these situations
and provides:
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each
other, except by agreement of both parties. On motion, however,
the court, if it finds that the obligation of either party is likely
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to be uncollectible, may order that both parties make payment
into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the funds
received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment
into court by either party had been a payment to the other party and any distribution of those funds back to the party making
payment had been a payment to him by the other party.59
Effect of release of one tortfeasor on the contribution rights of
the others. While it is clear that an injured party can release one of
several tortfeasors who are liable in solido without releasing the
others," the question remains of what rights of contribution the
others should have against the released tortfeasor. There are three
possible solutions to this problem, and each of them is subject to objections. The first-to allow contribution -discourages settlements,
since a defendant (or his insurance carrier) will not be inclined to
settle if he remains subject to additional liability to the other tortfeasors. The second-to refuse to allow contribution-is conducive
to collusion between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor and
may be quite unfair to the other tortfeasors. The third solution is to
provide that the injured party's claim to damages is reduced by the
proportionate part of the claim that should have been paid by the
settling tortfeasor. While this has some tendency to discourage the
injured party from settling with a single tortfeasor, it seems the
least objectionable of the three solutions and is the one adopted in
section 6 of the Uniform Act. It also appears to be the position now
followed in Louisiana." But it may be well to check to see that a
statutory provision is not needed to insure that the released tortfeasor can be joined as a third-party defendant for the purpose not
of obtaining a judgment against him but of determining his faultproportion of the total obligation. 2
What kind of conduct by defendants is covered by the new Louisiana provisions? The answer to this question is not entirely clear.
Article 2103, providing for dividing the obligation among the defendants according to their fault, refers to an offense or a quasi-offense.
59. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 3 (as revised in 1979).
60. Article 2203 of the Civil Code provides that rights against the others may be
"expressly reserved."
61. For exposition of the Louisiana law, see Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 523
F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1975); F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 112(1), in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 153-54 (1977). Both of these are speaking of contribution on the basis of virile
portions. But there is no reason to anticipate that the same position would not be
taken under the new provision putting contribution on the basis of proportionate fault.
62. Some change for the purpose may be needed in Civil Code article 2103, or in
article 1111 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure or in a new provision. Of course,
no provision was needed when contribution was on the basis of virile portions, since
the parties could determine for themselves what the released tortfeasor's share was.
For handling in the Uniform Act, see UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(a).
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But article 2323, referring to plaintiff's fault, speaks only of contributory negligence. Does this apply to such conduct as that imposing liability for strict liability (for products or abnormally dangerous
activities), nuisance, intentional torts, or breach of warranty? The
Uniform Act refers in section 1(a) to "an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to
property" and provides that the conduct "includes acts or omissions
that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or
property ... of others or that subject a person to strict tort liability
[and] . . .includes breach of warranty." There may be reason to
clarify the Louisiana provisions.
What kind of conduct on the part of the plaintiff is covered by
the Louisiana provision? The Louisiana provision clearly covers contributory negligence. Under all conditions? Suppose that under the
previous case law contributory negligence did not bar plaintiff's
recovery in the particular situation-such as, for example, suit on
the basis of defendant's strict liability or recklessness or in a lastclear-chance situation. Fairness would seem to indicate that the statute should apply here, too. The case law developed under the old allor-nothing principle. The reduced recovery under comparative negligence should now replace both "all" and "nothing." The language of
article 2323 states the "effect" of contributory negligence "when [it]
is applicable to a claim for damages." This might be construed as
meaning that the article applies only when contributory negligence
would previously have barred recovery, which would be unfortunate. In any event, it is desirable that the statutory provisions indicate a definite answer to this question. The Uniform Act provides
in section 1(a) that its "rule applies whether or not under prior law
the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under legal doctrines such as last clear chance." I strongly
recommend a provision to this general effect.
What about other forms of plaintiff's fault, such as assumption
of risk, misuse of a product, or avoidable consequences? These concepts raise difficult problems of verbalization since the terms cover
various meanings in different situations, such as plaintiff's fault, consent to the conduct, lack of duty or breach of duty on the part of the
defendant, or lack of proximate cause. Reduction of damages for
comparative fault should be confined to the meaning of those terms
involving plaintiff's fault and should not apply to the others. The
problem is how to say this clearly. The Louisiana provisions resolve
the problem by ignoring it and leaving it for the courts to solve
without direction. The Uniform Act meets the problem by saying in
section 1(b) that the Act covers and includes "unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse
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of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and
unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages." The
language may perhaps be improved upon, but it at least gives the
court useful guidance. Failure to make provision has given some
other states considerable trouble and the Louisiana legislature
should seriously consider the matter.
What should be the standardfor the trier of fact to use in determining percentages of fault? This is a difficult question, ignored in
most statutes and not treated in the Louisiana provisions. Obviously, there is no precise test. This has been one of the criticisms
offered by opponents of comparative negligence. But just as obviously, any reasonable apportionment, though it may be somewhat
crude, is far superior to that ultimate crudity-the all-or-nothing
position of the English common law. In England, where the jury is
no longer used in personal-injury cases, the innate imprecision is
frankly recognized in the English statute, which gives the judge
authority to reduce the damages "to such extent as the court thinks
just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the
responsibility for the damage."63 This would probably be more confusing than helpful to a jury. In any event, consideration needs to be
given not only to the measure of culpability but also to the relative
closeness of the causal relation between the actor's conduct and the
injury. Several courts have construed statutes to this effect and
others have dealt in terms of comparative causation, especially in
cases of products liability."4 The doctrine of last clear chance should
also be absorbed into comparative fault. Section 2(b) of the Uniform
Act provides that in "determining the percentages of fault, the trier
of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at
fault and the extent of the causal relations between the conduct and
the damages claimed." The comment to the section explains this further and may offer assistance to the judge in instructing the jury.
How are parties to be treated when one party's fault is imputed
to another or would have barred another's cause of action under
contributory negligence? Some examples: (1) The plaintiff is injured
by negligence of an employee and the employer is not independently
negligent. They are normally treated as a single party for the purpose of determining the percentage of fault. (2) One spouse is injured by the negligence of a tortfeasor. The other spouse seeks to
63. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. Maine's
statute allows damages to be "reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and
equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1978).
64. See Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Lovesee v. Allied Dev. Co.,
45 Wis. 2d 340, 173 N.W.2d 196 (1970). For discussion of the "comparative-causation
cases" in products liability, see Products Liability, supra note 53, at 378-79.
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recover for loss of services. Contributory negligence of the injured
spouse is usually charged against the deprived spouse. (3) A person
is killed by the joint negligence of himself and the defendant. In a
wrongful death action the deceased's negligence is usually charged
against his statutory beneficiaries. (4) A manufacturer puts out a
dangerously defective product but it is packaged and the retailer
sells it without any negligence in failing to discover its defective
condition. The retailer would probably be entitled to indemnity from
the manufacturer, and the two may well be treated as a single person in allocating percentages of fault.
What should the comparative negligence statutes do about all of
this? The only pertinent reference in the Louisiana provisions is in
article 2323 providing that a claim for damages when there is contributory negligence "shall be reduced in proportion to the degree
or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the
injury, death or loss." This language may not cover some of the examples above. The Uniform Act has three relevant phrases. It
speaks in section 1(a) of "contributory fault chargeable to the claimant" and of "an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory
fault," and provides in section 2(a)(2) that for the purpose of allocating fault "the court may determine that two or more persons are
to be treated as a single party." Any language used will have to be
general in scope, leaving much to the discretion of the trial court.
There is one problem in this connection, however, that should be
carefully considered in Louisiana. This is the application of the new
statutory provisions to a liability insurance carrier under the Louisiana direct-action practice.65 Can this properly be left to the trial
courts, or is a legislative determination desirable?
What should be done about a tortfeasor who has an immunity to
tort liability? Neither the Louisiana provisions nor the Uniform Act
makes any reference to this problem. This seems wise. Immune tortfeasors should not be made parties to the action or have their
percentages of fault determined. The case should proceed without
them, once it is clear that the immunity to the tort liability exists
and will also apply to rights of contribution.
But there may be some situations in which the position may be
taken that rights of contribution should not be barred. One situation
involves an immunity that is not categoric but is confined only to
claims by certain people. An example is an intra-family immunity.
Several states, including Louisiana, hold that this immunity is essentially procedural, since its purpose is solely to prevent the maintenance of an action brought by another member of the same family
65.

LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962). F. STONE, supra note 61, at §§ 112(4) & 114.
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and, therefore, does not bar a claim for contribution brought by a
third party.66 In this situation it may be well to make sure that the
family member can be joined as a party defendant for the sole purpose of determining his fault-proportion of the total obligation, so
that his amount may be subtracted from the plaintiff's claim.
The second situation involves an employer's immunity to tort
liability under the worker's compensation statutes and the rights
and liabilities of third parties. In the original trade-off when
worker's compensation was initially adopted the employer's undertaking to pay compensation even though not negligent was balanced
against the relieving him of the common law tort liability. This
trade-off has worked satisfactorily between the parties to the
system, but it may unfairly discriminate against a third-party defendant on whom the employment system rests the total responsibility
without any compensating benefit. Assume that a manufacturer produces a machine that has a minor defect-a screw was not fully
tightened. The employer who purchased the machine and uses it in
his plant provides no maintenance for it and fails to instruct the
employee on how to use it safely. Six years later the screw drops
out (though indications that it was loose had been present for some
time) and the employee is hurt. Suit is brought against the manufacturer, who is held liable for the total injury. Although some states
allow contribution against the employer on the basis of proportionate fault,67 the majority, including Louisiana, 8 do not. I suggest that
this is not consistent with the striving toward equal justice that the
66. See Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965). Accord, Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Zarrella v. Miller,
100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966). The majority rule is otherwise. E.g., Yellow Cab Co.
v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Norfolk So. R. Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597,
174 S.E. 841 (1934).
1 67. E.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d
437 (1979); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972).
68. In LeJeune v. Highlands Insurance Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973),
the court held that Revised Statutes 23:1032 was controlling and prevented an action
for contribution, and then said:
It cannot be logically denied that negligent third parties have been cast in an
unenviable position and have gained nothing in return for their loss of the right of
contribution. To correct this inequity at the expense of disrupting the reasoning
behind the compensation principle, however, is not a proper alternative for this
court. This is a situation which addresses itself to the legislative prerogative,
rather than to judicial review.
Id. at 533. Revised Statutes 23:1032 was subsequently amended to remove another
perceived inequity but not this one. 1976 La. Acts, No. 147 § 1, amending LA. R.S.
23:1032 (1950).
See generally 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76 (1976 & Supp.
1979); Davis, Third Party Tortfeasor's Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers are Negligent, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571 (1976).
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new Louisiana provisions portray and that it is one of the occasions
on which manufacturers have a legitimate complaint regarding the
working of product liability law.
The Uniform Act has no provisions on this problem because it
was conceived to be primarily a concern of the individual state's
policy regarding worker's compensation and therefore inappropriate
in a Uniform Act. 9 The subject warrants careful consideration by
the Louisiana legislature.
There are a number of other problems deriving from the incidental effects of a comparative fault system, but these are the major
problems deserving conscious attention and decision.
CONCLUSION

At the time when Louisiana overlooked her civil law tradition
and adopted the English common law doctrine of contributory negligence, that doctrine was unanimously followed in the United States.
But since that time the federal government and more than twothirds of the states have repudiated contributory negligence and
adopted some form of comparative fault. In now discarding contributory negligence and abandoning the small group of slightly more
than a dozen die-hard states, Louisiana now finds that by adopting a
form of comparative fault, she has come to be in accord with what
must currently be recognized, as the true common law rule,"9 not
69. The NCCUSL Committee drafting the Uniform Comparative Fault Act prepared a section for the Act but decided to drop it. This action was not based on the
merits of the section but on the ground that it belonged in the worker's compensation
act rather than this one. It provided:
[Section xx. Action by Employee Against Third-Party Defendant.]
(a) If an employee who has claimed or is entitled to claim against the employer
benefits under [the worker's compensation act] brings a tort action against
another person to recover additional damages for the injury, the employer may be
joined by the defendant as a party for the purpose of determining the percentage
of fault allocable in accordance with Section 2 to the employer in comparison with
the combined fault of all of the parties, including the claimant.
(b) On the basis of those findings the court shall determine the award to the
claimant by subtracting from the amount of the damages half of the amount that,
except for the [worker's compensation act], would have been allocated as the
primary responsibility of the employer; and it shall render judgment in accordance with the provisions of Section 2. After paying the judgment, the defendant
may recover from the employer the other half of the amount that would have
been allocated to the employer.
70. Contribution between joint tortfeasors has set a pattern for this. The original
common law rule was that there was no contribution. A few states judicially changed
the rule because of its unfairness. Many more have done this by statute. Now the
Torts Restatement expressly provides that the common law rule is that "there is a
right of contribution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979). If Chapter 17
(§§ 463-96) of the Restatement were being published today instead of in 1965, it would
certainly be very different.
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only in this country but in England itself and in all other so-called
common law countries. By way of serendipity, she is by the same action, both reclaiming her "forgotten heritage"7 1 and joining the
"march of comparative negligence""2 that is now becoming a stampede. There is good reason for the legal profession in Louisiana to
congratulate itself on the accomplishment.
According to my evaluation, the central basis of the Louisiana
provisions should be regarded as excellent. Some refinements may
be useful and these I have discussed. If they should be found to be
commendable, their enactment would not interfere with the central
basis as incorporated in the current provisions.
Welcome aboard, Louisiana! We common law states are happy to
have you join the great majority of us. We hope our experience has
been and will continue to be of assistance to you, and we believe
that your ideas and their implementation will be useful to us. Together, we are moving toward a position that will justify the assertion that the doctrine of comparative fault is the common law of the
United States.
71. Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L.
REV. 125 (1945).
72. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (pts. 1-2), 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV.

189, 304 (1950).

